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Peacemaking among inconsistent rationalities? 
Kacelnik, Schuck-Paim and Pompilio (this volume, p. 377) show that rationality axi-
oms from economics are neither necessary nor sufficient to guarantee that animal be-
havior is biologically adaptive. To illustrate that biological adaptiveness does not imply 
conformity with the consistency axioms of economics, Kacelnik et al describe animals 
that sensibly experiment with actions yielding sub-maximum levels of short-term en-
ergy intake to monitor their environments for change, leading to apparently intransitive 
patterns of choice that are nevertheless biologically adaptive. Invalidating the converse 
claim that economic rationality implies biological adaptiveness is Kacelnik et al’s ex-
ample of female ruffs that are worse off when they conform to the constant-ratio rule, 
frequently interpreted as a normative consistency requirement of economic rationality. 
Together, the two examples demonstrate that axiomatic norms are both unnecessary and 
insufficient for determining whether a particular behavior is biologically adaptive.  
Additionally, Kacelnik et al call into question what has been reported in the animal 
behavior literature as preference reversals, such as risk attitudes among wild rufous 
hummingbirds or the food-hoarding propensities of grey jays. Kacelnik et al attribute 
apparent reversals to state-dependent fitness functions modulated by subtle differences 
in the training phase of animal experiments. For example, animals trained on menus that 
include a strictly dominated option will tend to have lower accumulated energy reserves 
and therefore exhibit systematically different patterns of choice––not because they fail 
to maximize, but because their training has induced systematically different nutritional 
states. Another possible explanation for preference reversals in animal studies with 
strictly dominated, or “decoy” options is that menus containing dominated items may 
convey valid information about future opportunities (Houston and McNamara, 1999). If 
menus are correlated through time, then menus with inferior options today predict scar-
city in the future and imply a distinct optimal course of action, in violation of regularity 
assumptions that posit invariance with respect to the inclusion of strictly dominated al-
ternatives. There are other basic examples from biology in which individual deviation 
from axiomatic norms is consistent with adaptiveness. For example, in environments 
with payoff structures that can be modeled as cooperative games, a family’s best re-
sponse sometimes requires individual family members to behave suboptimally as part of 
a diversification strategy that reduces the risk of reproductive failure (Hutchinson, 
1996). Futhermore, theoretical biologists have documented the fragility of expected-
fitness maximizing behaviour with respect to the assumption of stable environments. 
Once the model allows for shocks to the environment’s stochastic structure, simple be-
havior rules that are suboptimal (in terms of expected fitness) when viewed narrowly 
from the perspective of unchanging payoffs in a fixed environment may outperform 
rules based on maximazation (Bookstaber and Langsam, 1985). 
We congratulate Kacelnik et al for their demonstration of the inadequacy of what we 
call content-blind norms (Gigerenzer, 1996). Consistency axioms are content-blind, 
because, by definition, they are merely syntactical, without reference to semantics (what 
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the symbols refer to) and, as a consequence, to pragmatics (real-world goals of decision 
makers). Their examples illustrate the importance of clearly specifying the animal’s 
environment and the critical role that subtle shifts in context can play in determining 
which norms should be applied in evaluating the rationality of observed behavior. Con-
tent-blind norms derived from domain-general axiomizations of rationality are too strict 
because they rule out many behaviors that are genuinely adaptive. At the same time, 
content-blind norms lead to overly general characterizations of rational behavior that 
include many behaviors that are harmful to those who adopt them.  
Content-blind norms are inconsistent with ecological rationality 
Kacelnik et al claim that axiomatic norms (i.e., content-blind norms), although de-
scriptively false and normatively irrelevant in many instances, are nevertheless interest-
ing as benchmarks of rational behavior. The authors seek to harmonize different, some-
times contradictory, definitions of rationality and report that such harmonization is 
already underway. We argue instead that there is a genuine conflict between content-
blind and content-based notions of rationality, one that is worth highlighting and sub-
jecting to further empirical competition rather than calling for premature peace negotia-
tions. As Kacelnik et al’s examples demonstrate, content-blind norms, by themselves, 
are neither necessary nor sufficient for telling reasonable from unreasonable behavior. 
An alternative notion of reasonableness is ecological rationality (Gigerenzer et al, 
1999), which, unlike content-blind norms, is in our view consistent with long-studied 
notions of adaptiveness in biology. Thus, we wish that Kacelnik et al, who have taken 
one step, would take the next step of de-prioritizing content-blind norms and the con-
comitant methodological focus on deviations from consistency axioms adopted from 
economics and mathematical decision theory.  
Following Herbert Simon, we understand ecological rationality to be the study of ac-
tual processes giving rise to observed behavior and the extent to which those processes 
exploit the structure of the environment in reaching task-specific goals. Consistent with 
Kacelnik et al’s examples, ecological rationality’s key criterion for assessing the rea-
sonableness of behavior is whether a satisfactory match between behavior and the re-
quirements of the external environment is achieved. Ecological rationality enjoys the 
advantage that it accommodates historically determined starting points (i.e., state-
dependence) and interdependencies among individuals needed to account for social in-
telligence. Its flexibility in allowing for heterogeneity with respect to different environ-
ments is costly, however, in terms of its empirical demands, because its core matching 
concept requires context-specific descriptions of both observed behavior and the appro-
priate normative benchmark.  
The cost-savings appeal of applying axiomatic norms to all environments and tasks is 
understandable in that it saves work examining precisely when and where such norms 
make sense as prescriptive guidelines. One wonders, however, why axiomatic norms 
continue to hold interest, and why measurement of deviations from axiomatic norms 
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remains a methodological priority, after the simultaneous narrowness and excessive 
flexibility of such norms have been established? We elaborate below on the simultane-
ous narrowness and excessive flexibility of axiomatic consistency conditions to further 
motivate our claim that measured deviations from axiomatic norms are a less interesting 
object of study than the actual processes that guide animal behavior. Describing such 
processes in detail and checking their performance against the requirements of the envi-
ronment would seem to be a higher priority than simply noting whether observed animal 
behavior conforms to the consistency axioms of economic rationality. 
Economists usually define rationality as a short list of domain-general axioms that 
require internally consistent behavior (e.g., Arrow, 1951; Debreu, 1959; Arrow and 
Hahn, 1971; Sen, 1993, 1997; Mas-Colell et al, 1995). In its Libertarian rhetoric of con-
sumer sovereignty, economic theory has almost nothing to say about the rationality of 
any single choice considered in isolation. Instead, economic rationality applies exclu-
sively to pairs of choices. By far, the most important restriction that economic rational-
ity imposes on pairs of choices is the consistency axiom: If option A is taken when B is 
available, then option B may be taken only when A is unavailable. 
The consistency axiom is surprisingly flexible in that, oftentimes, it eliminates very 
few patterns of choice as inadmissible according to its definition. Consider, for exam-
ple, a decision maker who makes two choices—choice 1 from menu {a,b,c} and choice 
2 from menu {c,d,e}. Because only one item belongs to both menus, there is no observ-
able pattern of choice that can falsify the consistency axiom. Notice that choosing b 
from {a,b,c} reveals two pairwise rankings, bfa and bfc. And choice of c from {c,d,e} 
reveals the rankings cfd and cfe. To violate the consistency axiom, a reversal among 
revealed pairwise rankings must take place, such as afb and then bfa. Without any 
pairs of objects in common across menus, economic rationality is nonbinding. Apparent 
violations of economic rationality observed in experimental studies are therefore ex-
tremely fragile to the alternative hypothesis of noncomparable menus from differing 
contexts across choice acts.  
Axiomatic rationality’s potential for flexibility induces economists to make further 
assumptions (e.g., about the contents and shape of the utility function) that often lead to 
extreme rigidity (Simon, 1999). The wide span of flexibility to rigidity within the eco-
nomic rationality paradigm shows through particularly at the moment of analysis in 
which menu items are labeled—either with context-specific markers implying that all 
choices are rational or without context markers, in which case absolute uniformity 
across choice contexts is necessarily assumed. A taste for variety (e.g., choosing apple 
from the menu {apple, orange} on Monday, and orange from {apple, orange} on Tues-
day) can be made to satisfy the consistency axiom by partitioning the space of consump-
tion bundles to include dates.  Given that A on Monday was chosen over B on Monday, 
the consistency axiom does not imply that A on Tuesday is preferred over B on Tuesday.  
A on Monday and A on Tuesday are considered wholly different objects of choice, as 
distinct as guns and butter. Note, too, that apples on Monday are distinct from apples on 
Tuesday, not because preferences have changed, but because the contexts of choice are 
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possibly different. If, on the other hand, day-of-the-week labels are dropped from the 
description of apples, then those who sensibly pursue variety in fruit consumption over 
the course of the week are rigidly categorized in the irrational category. 
Although the potential flexibility of economic rationality is sometimes presented as 
one of its chief selling points, flexibility is viewed by many of its critics as economic 
rationality’s foremost flaw. Economic rationality is, by design, unhinged from moral, 
ethical, and other widely accepted normative criteria, including biological fitness, crite-
ria that take much stronger stands in ruling out specific one-off behaviors (not just in-
consistent pairs) as irrational. Suicide, addiction, ethnic hatred, war, corruption, terror-
ism—virtually any anti-social behavior one can imagine, as well as pro-social behavior 
of many varieties (see, for example, Fehr and Schmidt [1999])—are routinely rational-
ized according to the elastic notion of economic rationality.   
The convergence story 
Observing that consistency-based economic rationality has become prominent in the 
animal behavior literature, Kacelnik et al set out to compare and contrast economic ra-
tionality vis a vis biological rationality, while distinguishing them from two other forms 
of rationality, namely, philosophical and psychological. A key theme of Kacelnik et al is 
that economic rationality is often violated by human subjects in psychological and ex-
perimental economics. They argue that the many studies from recent decades in psy-
chology and economics that challenge the descriptive validity of axiomatic rationality 
are leading toward a harmonization of rationality perspectives, converging to Kacelnik 
et al’s preferred multi-rationality concept of rationality. They see a convergence of per-
spectives among participants in the rationality debates (p. 385): 
The convergence between human cognitive psychologists, economists and 
biologists in both considering and questioning the paramount role of con-
sistency is promising: while all of them find that the axioms of microeco-
nomic theory that defined [economic] E-rationality are systematically viola-
ted by decision-makers under many experimental circumstances, there is a 
growing realization that this does not imply that decision-makers operate 
inefficiently in real life. 
It would be nice if that were the case, but unfortunately it is not. Economists who are 
most sympathetic to psychological research generally believe that errors are ubiquitous 
and damaging (Thaler, 1991; Conlisk, 1996; Camerer et al, 2003), implying that gov-
ernments should intervene paternalistically to “de-bias” individuals beset by a patho-
logical mélange of psychological biases (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2003; Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2003; Choi et al, 2005). The sentiment is traveling fast into legal scholarship 
and academic disciplines that analyze politics, policy, constitutions and the design of 
other important institutions (Jolls et al, 1998; Trout, 2005).  
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Observing that consistency axioms fail to describe what people do—people, by the 
way, who get into college, hold jobs, sustain long-term social interactions, and interact 
with myriad cultural institutions without violence or other noticeably disruptive fric-
tions—the key question of interpretation is whether it is the axioms or the people who 
are at fault. Behavioral economics explicitly sides with the axioms and their normative 
requirements, leaving no choice but to label actual human behavior, however normal 
and functional, as pathological and mistaken (see, for example, Thaler’s [1991] Quasi 
Rational Economics, Camerer et al’s [2003] Advances in Behavioral Economics, and 
Kahneman’s 2003 Nobel lecture, “Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behav-
ioral economics”).  
Herein lies a critical debate. Given that standard axiomatic norms of rationality are 
empirically false, does one hang on to the axioms and fault people’s behavior, or drop 
the axioms as irrelevant? We will discuss cases (as Kacelnik et al do, although with dif-
ferent interpretations) in which axioms are violated and people nevertheless perform 
well, calling into question the normative relevance of such axioms.  
Contrary to what one might infer from Kacelnik et al’s optimistic account, the debate 
over how to interpret empirical departures from axiomatic norms is not very well cov-
ered in economics or psychology. The distinctions between dominant biases-and-errors 
interpretations (Kahneman et al, 1982) and alternatives put forward by those working in 
the smart heuristics paradigm (Gigerenzer et al, 1999) need to be emphasized, not pa-
pered over.  
By developing a methodology focused on deviations from axiomatic rationality, one 
in fact strengthens the normative centrality of the axiomatic approach. Many, even those 
who are open to the idea of smart deviations from axiomatic rationality, such as Kacel-
nik et al, apparently fail to see this. For example, Kacelnik et al write: “The gold stan-
dard of consistency embodied in E-rationality axioms, even if violated by real subjects, 
provide[s] yardsticks against which to assess behavior,” (p. 385).  
But why? Once we realize that sensible, reasonable, and functionally effective be-
havior need not adhere to rationality axioms, it follows that the rationality-axiom yard-
stick is of limited relevance. The real question is the extent to which behavior is func-
tional, well-performing, and well-matched to currently existing institutions.  We will see 
that the consistency axiom has no predictive power concerning the performance of be-
havior evaluated by these criteria. 
Rejecting consistency and keeping it? 
Kacelnik et al define biological rationality as “consistent fitness maximization.” As 
the authors point out, this is merely economic rationality with an additional constraint, 
namely, that the function being consistently maximized is specified in an objective 
sense determined by externally given biological structure. As a logical consequence, 
biologically rational behavior is a subset of economically rational behavior, and biologi-
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cally rational implies economically rational. The converse is not true, of course, be-
cause the weaker concept of economic rationality merely requires consistency while 
placing virtually no restrictions on the objective (perhaps a weighted combination of 
goals) being pursued. As emphasized earlier, the “best” in economics has no essential 
content—only the restriction that what is not best now may not later become best as 
long as the current best is still available. It is also the case that, by framing choice as an 
optimization process, the economic model obviates the need to deal with the important 
real-world problems of searching for alternatives, getting to know what is possible, and 
learning how actions relate to anticipated payoffs.   
It is unclear whether Kacelnik et al approve of the normative authority of the consis-
tency requirements they write about, such as transitivity. For example, they observe: “If 
preferences are non-transitive it is fair to assume that the decision makers are not con-
sistent in choosing the best for them, namely, are not rational” (p. 381). Are they report-
ing the way economists think, or are they agreeing with the standard normative claim?  
We now demonstrate that decision processes may be intransitive and nevertheless 
systematic and sensible. In so doing, we intend to call into question why transitivity 
should be held out as a litmus test for rationality. See Brandstätter, Gigerenzer and 
Hertwig (2006) for another example of a sensible albeit intransitive decision procedure 
that, additionally, is shown to predict the choice behavior of nonpathological human 
subjects better than models that assume transitivity do.  
The following example is adapted from Rubinstein (1998). Consider a decision task 
in which one picks an item from a long catalog, (c, a, z, …, b), with items arranged se-
quentially according to the catalog-maker’s pagination scheme. If forced to choose 
among pairs of items, we suppose that the decision maker prefers item a over item b, b 
over c, and—respecting transitivity—a over c. However, because the catalog contains 
many pages and time is scarce, the decision maker adopts the following shortcut deci-
sion rule: Consider the first and last item in the catalog and take the best among the 
two. This decision rule is quick, perfectly systematic, and for some weighting of time 
costs and expected marginal benefits from searching through the middle pages of the 
catalog, yields payoffs that are just as good as those of maximization (although this is 
not the essential point). The main point is that the decision rule generates preference 
reversals, is therefore intransitive, and yet its performance is not necessarily bad.  
According to the economic theory of rational choice, the sequence in which feasible 
sets are expressed should play no role, since optimization is defined by picking the 
maximal item from a set, and sets, as mathematical objects, have no intrinsic order. 
(Unlike vectors, which can be used to represent ordered objects such as catalogs, menus 
and search paths, sets are order-free. For example, the sets {1, 2, 3} and {2, 1, 3} are 
equivalent, and the most preferred item from each set must, by definition, be the same.) 
However, logically equivalent expressions of the feasible set—that is, catalogs with the 
items arranged in different sequences—result in inconsistent choices. Our claim is that 
this kind of inconsistency cannot a priori be assigned a negative interpretation.  
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When presented with the catalog (c, a, z, …, b), the shortcut decision rule considers c 
and b, and chooses b, even though a is available. Choosing b when a is available im-
plies, according to standard economic theory, the revealed ranking of b over a. When 
presented with the same choice set arranged in a different sequence, in the form of the 
alternative catalog (a, b, z, …, c), the shortcut decision rule considers a and c, and 
chooses a. Because a is chosen when b was available, the revealed ranking is a over b.  
The inconsistency of the shortcut rule in generating implied rankings of a over b, and b 
over a, depending on the ordering of the catalog’s contents, is precisely the kind of in-
consistency ruled out by axiomatic economic rationality. Nevertheless, the decision rule 
is sensible and systematic. Is the axiom or the behavior at fault?  
The dominant interpretation of preference reversals and other deviations from axio-
matic consistency requirements in economics, psychology and, increasingly, throughout 
the social sciences, is that the axioms are correct and people using such shortcut rules 
must be wrong. We must protest against this interpretation and ask its proponents for 
clearer explanations. If reasonable behavior is possible with or without axioms, what is 
the appeal of studying domain-general consistency requirements? 
Sen (1993) provided at least one negative answer to that question, suggesting that 
domain-general consistency requirements, at least in social choice problems, may have 
no intrinsic appeal––that external values relating actions to context-specific meanings 
are required in all cases to make sense of behavior, and to make normative judgments 
distinguishing reasonable from unreasonable behavior. A priori consistency require-
ments without specification of the context in which choice occurs are themselves unrea-
sonable according to Sen. It is surprising that Kacelnik et al cite Sen without absorbing 
his central point regarding the arbitrary and therefore unhelpful role of internal consis-
tency requirements, as opposed to the context-derived “entailed consistency,” which 
Sen defends.  
Inconsistent content-blind norms 
In addition to economic and biological rationality, Kacelnik et al briefly consider 
philosophical and psychological definitions of rationality, emphasizing the message that 
rationality has many flavors, all with distinct virtues and nuances. They are right: Psy-
chological rationality is not of one piece; it is a patchwork. Although psychology has 
many content-bound moral, developmental, and social norms, in recent times, many 
psychologists have adopted similar content-blind norms to those of economic rational-
ity.  
Consistency and other laws of first-order logic are content-blind because, by defini-
tion, semantics and pragmatics are ignored in logic. The existence of multiple norms 
and the fact that one has to justify a norm by studying what goals a person is trying to 
achieve are suppressed by those who compare people’s judgments simply “with an ac-
cepted rule of arithmetic, logic, or statistics” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982, p. 493). In 
this spirit, psychologists have evaluated the behavior of others against the laws of the 
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truth table, Bayes’s rule, expected utility, consistency, and other statistical principles. 
The problem is that these norms are not the same. For instance, beginning in the 1960s, 
psychologists declared people’s choices in one of the most widely researched reasoning 
problems, the “selection task,” as irrational because the choices deviated from the laws 
of logic. Yet when others applied Bayes’s rule to the same problem, people’s choices 
were rehabilitated as rational (Oaksford and Chater, 1994).  
Similarly, since the 1970s, psychologists have interpreted a certain pattern of judg-
ments as exhibiting overconfidence bias, and another as evidence of the regression fal-
lacy (i.e., misinterpreting statistical regression as a substantive effect). Yet the pattern 
called overconfidence turned out to be a direct consequence of regression towards the 
mean (Erev et al, 1994). The norm of the day turns into the fallacy of tomorrow (for 
more, see Gigerenzer, 2004). Our general point is that psychology is a good case from 
which one can learn the lesson that content-blind norms tend to be inconsistent with one 
another and lack the potential to produce insight into the adaptive nature of behavior.  
Why not move on? 
Kacelnik et al may sincerely hope to harmonize the overlapping interests of animal 
behavior researchers and economic and psychological researchers focused on biases and 
errors with the ecological rationality paradigm of Gigerenzer (2000), Gigerenzer and 
Selten (2001), and Smith (2003). The two approaches are in unmistakable disagreement 
with each other, however, and Kacelnik et al’s peacemaking appears premature.  
Perhaps the strongest case for harmonization that Kacelnik et al make concerns state-
dependent preferences. State-dependence in economics is illustrated, for example, by 
the observation that consumers’ willingness to pay for umbrellas goes up when it rains; 
that the value of savings usually declines when one has a terminal illness; and that the 
consumption of classical music can increase the marginal benefit of subsequent listen-
ings to classical music (Becker, 1996). This is a rather old subject within economic the-
ory, however, and the idea that the added complexity state-dependent preferences can 
rationalize apparently inconsistent pairs of choice is not at all consistent with the main 
criticisms of the biases-and-heuristics program based on ecological rationality.  
Another rationalization of observed suboptimal choices comes from theories of 
learning and experimentation. Choosing in an apparently inconsistent manner some-
times provides information about the range of choices available to the decision maker, 
and about the state of the environment and whether it has recently changed. If the bene-
fit of information is high and the cost of slightly suboptimal behavior is low, the stan-
dard economic framework permits one to rationalize a certain amount of randomization 
and experimentation, implying the rationality of suboptimal action in the neighborhood 
of optimal actions. This again is appreciably removed from ecological rationality’s key 
criticisms of biases-and-heuristics research and its determined measurement of devia-
tions from axiomatic rationality. 
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Kacelnik et al’s sympathy for axiomatic rationality and as-if models of animal be-
havior is inherently in conflict with ecological rationality. Such sympathies are revealed 
by references to “biological optimality” without acknowledging that concept’s inherent 
weakness as discussed by Simon (1978): noncommensurable multiple objectives, ten-
sion between individual and group adaptiveness, and fundamental uncertainty in the 
environment (i.e., the kind that cannot be folded into the machinery of mathematical 
probability theory because event spaces are not specified and probabilities are unknow-
able). Thus, the authors appear to reject the main idea behind ecological rationality—
behavior evaluated by success in its own environment rather than by content-blind 
norms—although they politely repeat its conclusion that departures from axioms need 
not imply pathological behavior. 
Kacelnik et al get closest to ecological rationality when they provide examples from 
the animal behavior literature in which consistent behavior is maladaptive, and inconsis-
tent behavior is adaptive. In light of the author’s empirical observations the most obvi-
ous question would seem to be why consistency requirements hold any further interest 
at all. (See Kirman’s [1993] study of ant behavior for an economic analysis of aggregate 
efficiency without individual rationality.)  
Kacelnik et al claim to have exposed “contradictory meanings assigned to rational-
ity” (p. 392). Encouragingly, they write, “each flavour of the concept, however, is use-
ful in different ways” (p. 392). They are optimistic that “animal behavior research can 
benefit by referring to [the economic] framework” (p. 329). But they do not say how. 
The evidence they present showing that consistency does not guarantee adaptiveness 
seems to suggest the opposite conclusion.  
Should one be persuaded, as Kacelnik et al assert, that “documented violations of  
rationality in humans inspire new animal research” (p. 393)? And that “[r]ationality and 
its tribulations may foster truly multidisciplinary progress in understanding animal 
choice” (p. 393)? Such sentiments are likely to make friends, but whether they can lead 
to scientific progress is doubtful. 
Successful organisms are well adapted to their environments. This is the simple  
essence of ecological rationality. In contrast, axiomatic norms of self-consistency divert 
the research agenda to the study of individual deviations from these norms, which ne-
cessitates a proliferation of flavors of rationality: philosophical, psychological, biologi-
cal, economic, etc. Kacelnik et al think that we should celebrate multiple flavors of  
rationality, be open to possible synergies and overlaps, and—above all—not talk rudely 
about instances in which they disagree. Rather than joining this peacemaking program, 
we prefer to emphasize differences and distinctions that, we believe, will guide empiri-
cal decision-making science toward a clearer understanding of how real organisms  
behave. 
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